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CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A MOVEMENT IN SEARCH OF
MEANING
Stephen W. Bricker*
The children's rights movement is a unique phenomenon among
the various "rights" efforts today. Nonetheless, it shares some superficial similarities with the other antildiscrimination movements.
Children's rights, like those of blacks and women, concern the role
of an identifiable segment of our society which has traditionally
been placed at a legal and social disadvantage. The children's rights
movement also espouses the reallocation of legal power as a means
to correct this perceived imbalance.' Further, it grew out of the same
social currents, first apparent in the 1950's and 1960's, which pro2
duced the kindred civil rights efforts.
But a closer examination of the children's rights phenomenon
reveals differences which are much more fundamental. Of most
importance is the fact that the children's rights movement was
largely created by and remains under the control of adults, a group
not directly affected by the injustices sought to be corrected. The
major organizations in the country which put themselves forward as
the advocates for children function without any meaningful control
exercised by youth. Thus, the Children's Defense Fund, the National Juvenile Law Center, the Children's Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the Child Welfare League of
America, for example, all function under the exclusive control of
adults. Comparatively, can one seriously perceive the National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) or similar
civil rights groups functioning with exclusively white boards and
staffs? Where would civil rights be today if Martin Luther King, Jr.
had been white?
A closely related factor differentiating children's rights is the limited and mostly conflicting goals sought within the movement. None
* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1969; J.D., School of Law, University of Virginia, 1973;
former Staff Attorney, Children's Rights Project, American Civil Liberties Union.
1. See, e.g., Foster and Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972).
2. Hafen, Children'sLiberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to their Rights, B.Y.U. L. Rv. 605, 630-32 (1967).
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of the current child advocates has seriously suggested that children
should be treated on an equal basis with adults. John Holt, perhaps
the leading figure in advocating children's "liberation" from the
legal strictures of minority, would still allow children the choice of
remaining within the bounds of traditional childhood. ' Only if and
to the extent chosen by individual children themselves would Holt
grant them the rights of adults. On the other end of the spectrum
are those who would seek to retain and even strengthen the traditional legal restraints upon children.4
This gross divergence of opinion and goals within the movement
is not surprising. Since children themselves play no substantial role
in the movement, there is no common basis of experience from
which the leaders can draw to formulate their goals. Collective social experiences form the basis for all group decisions and, ultimately, for all law.5 While the adults within the children's rights
movement share with all of us a personal past which includes childhood, such is inadequate to the task of formulating policy responsive
to the "rights" of children. It lacks the emotional immediacy and
social cohesiveness necessary for effective group decision making.
The civil rights demonstrations of the 1950's and 1960's, for example, were more than a political vehicle towards the ultimate goal of
equality. Rather, they were a means for black people collectively to
define both the specific injuries caused by racism and the common
goals of the affected black communities. Without similar collective
involvement by children, the movement for enlargement of their
"rights" will remain a contradictory and patchwork effort.
This of course has enormous impact upon the development of the
law affecting children. The law has great difficulty accommodating
any social change. The largely unexamined confusion within the
child advocacy movement exacerbates the natural sluggishness of
the law in responding to the demands for change placed upon it.
Also created is a great danger for inconsistent and mistaken decision
making.
3. J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILHOOD (1974).

4. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 2.
5. See Lasswell and McDougal, The Relation of Law to Social Process: Trends in Theories
About Law, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 465 (1976).
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The purpose of this article is to analyze how the confusion over
children's rights has affected recent court decisions dealing with
juveniles. Of particular concern will be the relationship between the
child advocate's own view of the weight to be given the child plaintiff's decisions and the eventual outcome of a given case. Recent
cases dealing with foster care, mental commitment and abortions
will be examined.

I
Under common law standards, it is contradictory to speak of children's rights, for childhood is by definition a status of legal disability.' Children have traditionally been denied the basic rights of
democratic citizenship. While recent years have seen a multitude of
changes in the legal status of youth, the essential character of the
child's standing under the law remains unchanged. Children cannot
choose where to live. Their parents, or some other appointed legal
guardian, have the right to determine the child's place of residence. 7
Children are greatly restricted in the types of work they may seek
and cannot keep the wages of whatever employment they are able
to secure. Child labor laws generally exclude children from many
jobs.8 In most states, the child's parents, as a reciprocal right under
the duty to support, have the power to demand and keep any salary
or other income received by the child.9 Children are also functionally barred from most commercial transactions, since contracts entered into by children are generally voidable. 0 Perhaps most importantly, children are denied most political rights. While "children
retain certain free speech rights, they are denied the more basic
rights to vote and hold public office. 2 Thus, children are functionally excluded from the political process which might serve as an
avenue to the alteration of their legal status.
6. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42(2) (Repi. Vol. 1979).
7. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); In re Jewish Child Care Assn.,
5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
8. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-78 et seq. (Rep. Vol. 1976).
9. See, e.g., Cook v. Virginian Ry., 97 W. Va. 420, 125 S.E. 106, 109 (1924).
10. 2 WHMLSTON ON CONTRACTS, Ch. 9 (3d ed., 1959).
11. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 2; art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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This is not to say that any of this is per se wrong or unjust. The
reality is that children, for at least part of their childhood, are in
3
fact incapable of independently exercising the rights of citizenship.
Children are born in a largely helpless condition and are dependent
upon others for most aspects of their existence. The normal process
of childhood is, of course, the gradual development of adult physical
and psychological characteristics and capabilities such that the infant dependencies are eventually rejected. The age of majority, now
generally set at eighteen is designed to correspond with the time of
life when children are prepared for adulthood.' 4
Two logically separate issues do, however, arise from this situation. First, does the legislatively established age of majority appropriately correspond with the emotional and physiological realities of
childhood? In other words, do we delay childhood or certain aspects
of childhood too long such that the burdens of minority become
unjust? This question does not challenge the assum-ption that the
legal status of minority should be placed upon all children for at
least some portion of their lives. The second and more fundamental
issue does not question the concept of minority either, but questions
who should exercise power over the child's life during minority and
in what fashion. Are parents to be given complete decision-making
power over their children or should substantial decisional authority
also be exercised by state officials? The first of these issues, at what
age should children be "liberated" from childhood, is essentially an
issue of children's rights. The second, dealing with the allocation of
parenting power, is one of children's welfare. These two concepts,
children's rights and welfare, are most often confused and distorted
in meaning in both the literature and cases.
While there are an enormous number of variations of content one
can give to the term "right", its essential meaning is the power of
the individual to choose in any given area of life.' 5 For adults in this
society, this means the individual has, for example, the choice of
13. See generally A. Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 LAW & COErMP. PROB. 38 (Sum. 1975).
14. See Katz, Schxoeder and Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age
in America, 7 FAM. L. Q. 211 (1973).
15. See Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and the Limits
of Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1015, 1019-21 (1977).
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where to live, where to work, where to shop, and which candidate
to vote for. While there is an enormous variety of life factors which
limit the range of options available for an individual to choose from,
the law in theory does not directly intrude upon the unfettered
power of the individual to choose his own direction in those areas
of life that are the subjects of his "rights." In essence then, a right
is synonymous with the power of the individual to choose.
In the area of children and the law, the term "right" is often used
in an entirely different context. Many within the children's movement do not intend to alter the child's status of legal disability, but
still state that they intend to promote children's rights." Persons
within this school of thought, who have been described by one commentator as the "child savers,'

7

are not in reality promoting the

"rights" of children. While they may speak of the child's "right" to
some perceived benefit or service which they believe helpful to the
child's development, they are really seeking to impose on children,
and their parents, what they themselves view as beneficial to their
welfare. For example, social workers involved in child neglect cases
will often speak of the child's right to protection from harm. By this
they do not mean that they want the child to have the option to
choose a home suitable to his own notions of safety. Instead, what
they are really saying is that they themselves have determined that
the child's present home is inadequate and they have deemed it in
the child's welfare to intervene in his homelife in some fashion regardless of the child's wishes. A number of organizations and individuals have issued statements of similar "rights" which detail the
various aspects of life which they believe children should receive for
proper development.' 8 These often contain largely unenforceable
generalities. For example, the United Nations Declaration of the
Rights of the Child states: "The child.

. .

shall, wherever possible,

grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and
in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material
security .

. . ."I

Some such "rights" even explicitly reject the

16. See, e.g., Foster and Freed, supra note 1.
17. A. PLATr, THE CHm SAVFRS (1969).
18. See Foster and Freed, supra note 1; The Rights of Children-A Statement by Senator
Walter F. Mondale, 43 HARV. EDUC. Rnv. 483 (1973); R. FmisEN, BnTUGHTS (1979); United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, GAOR, 3rd Comm., Doc. 1386 (1959).
19. U.N. Declaration, supra note 18, Principle 6 (emphasis added).
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power of the child to choose whether to exercise his right. The
United Nations Declaration again states that the "child is entitled
to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory."'"
The error in this usage is not just semantic; it fundamentally
obscures analysis of the underlying worth of the purported benefit
to be gained by the child. It masks what is essentially propaganda
in the form of legal principles. If the exercise of the "benefit-right"
is not to be given to the affected child, it must be exercised by
someone else. Since many such "rights," like the right to protection,
in effect place obligations upon parents, the enforce:r of the right
must be someone outside the family. The logical supposition, and
the actual underlying assumption of most such "benefit-rights" is
that greater intervention into family life is necessary in order to
promote some aspect of children's lives. Regardless of whether this
is wise for children, it certainly cannot be said to promote their
rights in the basic sense of the power to choose.
II
This confusion between children's rights and children's welfare,
and the dangers it poses, is well illustrated by a review of the law
of juveniles' standing in litigation. The general rule is that children
lack legal capacity and cannot appear as parties to lawsuits on their
own. 2 ' If sued as a defendant, the child generally must have a guardian ad litem appointed." Otherwise the child will not be properly
brought before the court. As a plaintiff, the child must sue either
through a self-appointed next friend or a court-appointed guardian
ad litem." The child plaintiff or defendant is the real -party in interest in these circumstances and any adjudication rendered will bind
him just as it would bind any adult litigant.24 The guardian ad litem
or next friend, however, has control of the litigation and the authority to determine all positions advanced in the case, even where
inconsistent with the wishes of the child. 25 The only check on the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id., Principle 7 (emphasis added).
Bank of the United States v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 46, 50 (1834).
See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Shacklett's Adm'r, 111 Va. 423, 69 S.E. :335 (1910).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Counts, 106 Va. 7, 11, 54 S.E. 870, 871 (1906).
Id.
See, e.g., Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 115-16, 28 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1943).
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representative's power is the ability of the court to intervene and
appoint another guardian ad litem or next friend where such is
28
necessary to protect th6 child's best interests.
This common law tradition principally arose in cases dealing with
protection of the child's property or other financial interests.2 1 In
such cases, the guardian's determination of what position to advance in the litigation was a simple one: go for the bucks. Many of
the cases arose following times of war where the estates of fallen
soldiers, and the claims of their children, were before the courts for
adjudication.2 Such situations bear the potential for fraud and dishonesty and the courts acted to protect the financial interests of the
affected juveniles. More difficult issues such as those presented in
recent constitutional litigation were not even thought of. There was
little controversy over the philosophical or political issues present
in contemporary constitutional litigation and the power of the court
to appoint a new guardian was designed largely to act as a check
against financial dishonesty or waste of the minor's estate.
Against this simple but cogent background, the common law rules
of standing have thus far proved wholly inadequate for the task of
settling the procedural complexities which have arisen in recent
cases dealing with the constitutional rights of children. Most illustrative is Smith v. Organizationof Foster Families For Equality &
Reform. 2 9 This case broadly dealt with the issue of what procedural
protections if any, were constitutionally required for foster children
and foster families prior to a state-enforced separation. The complaint named individual foster children and their foster parents, as
well as the foster families' organization, as plaintiffs. 0 All were represented by the same counsel. In accord with common law notions
of standing and Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the complaint designated the foster parents as the "next friends" of
the plaintiff children. 3 ' The plaintiffs sought a common relief, ask26. Id. at 116, 28 S.E.2d at 42.
27. See, e.g., Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 95 S.E.2d 213 (1956); Garland v. Norfolk
Nat'l Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 156 Va. 653, 158 S.E. 88 (1931); Jackson v. Counts, 106
Va. 7, 54 S.E. 870 (1906).
28. See, e.g., Wilson v. Smith, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 493 (1872).
29. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (hereinafter referred to as OFFER).
30. Id. at 818-19.
31. Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
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ing that New York welfare authorities be required to provide an
adversary trial-type hearing prior to removing any foster child from
its foster parents when they had lived together as a family for more
than one year. 2 The lack of such a hearing was said to violate both
the foster parents' and the foster children's rights to family integrity
and due process.3
Responding to motions filed by the defendant welfare authorities,
the district court early in the litigation appointed "independent
counsel" to represent the plaintiff foster children "to forestall any
possible conflict of interests. ' 34 Although the complaint in the action was apparently never amended from its original claims on behalf of the foster children, their appointed representative through
the litigation took the position that the requested advance hearings
were not constitutionally required and, in fact, were contrary to the
children's best interest.
Appointed counsel for the children ... has consistently argued that
the foster parents have no such [constitutionally protected] liberty
interest independent of the interests of the foster children, and that
the best interests of the children would not be served by procedural
protections beyond those already provided by New York law.33
In fact, the children's appointed counsel appealed, along with the
defendants, the district court's judgment granting the children relief.36 Given common law rules of standing,3 7 as well as the general
evidentiary proposition that a party is bound to the admissions of
his attorney,3 this action would have seemingly precluded any relief
in the action in favor of the foster children. Neither the district court
nor the Supreme Court were deterred, however, from addressing and
deciding the children's original claims to constitutional protection
by their attorney's disavowel.
rev'd, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
32. 431 U.S. at 819-20.
33. Id. at 819-20, 842.
34. 418 F. Supp. at 278.
35. 431 U.S. at 839.
36. Id. at 823.
37. See argument of dissenting judge in the district court, 418 F. Supp. at 288.
38. See, e.g., C. FRIEND, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 255 (1977).
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The district court held that
before a foster child can be peremptorily transferred from the foster
home in which he has been living, be it to another foster home or to
the natural parents who initially placed him in foster care, he is
entitled to a hearing at which all concerned parties may present.any
relevant information to the administrative decisionmaker charged
with determining the future placement of the child."
This pre-removal hearing was required "as a matter of course" regardless of whether requested by the foster parents, the child, or the
natural parents. 0 "[I]t is required in all cases and cannot be made
to depend upon the initiative of third persons."" This holding was
based solely upon the foster child's independent right "to be heard
before being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss. ' '42 The district

court specifically declined to decide the question of whether the
foster parents had a constitutionally protected right to the continuation of their foster family, akin to the protections against state interference enjoyed by natural parents. Rather than "reach[ing] out to
decide such novel questions," the court found the children's rights
3
to present "narrower grounds . . . to support our decision.'
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that existent New York
procedures were sufficient to protect whatever liberty interests were
enjoyed by the foster family. The Court did not specifically decide
what liberty interest the foster parents and children enjoyed or,
more fundamentally, whether the Constitution gave them any protection. Instead, the Court decided the case only on the
"assumption" that the foster family has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest." Notwithstanding this somewhat artificial caveat,
and the Court's judgment sustaining the New York procedure, the
Court's opinion is very sympathetic to the interests of the foster
parents and children. The Court first recognized the significant constitutional protections extended to the natural family by substantive due process. "There does exist a 'private realm of family life
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

418 F. Supp. at 282.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id.
431 U.S. at 847.
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that has been afforded both sub-

stantive and procedural protection."45 While the foster family lacks
the biological relationships which legally underlie the natural family, the Court said that constitutional protections are not solely
limited to such blood relationships. "But biological relationships
are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family."" Instead, the principal factors determinative of the existence of a
"family," and presumably the constitutional protections which follow, are the emotional intimacy and commitment which flow from
the parent-child and husband-wife relationships:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals
involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments
that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role
it plays in 'promoting a way of life' through the instruction of children
• ..,as well as from the fact of blood relationship."
The Court further found that many foster families have the same
degree of emotional attachment as that found in natural families.
No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving arid interdependent relationship between an adult and child in his or her care may
exist even in the absence of blood relationship. At least where a child
has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his
natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in
the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family
should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child,
and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family."
While the Court did not delineate the constitutional significance of
this degree of similarity with the natural family, it did state that
"[flor this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere
collection of unrelated individuals. 49
On the merits of the constitutionality of the existent New York
procedure, the Court made several comments particularly relevant
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 842 (citations omitted).
at 843.
at 844 (citations omitted).
at 844-45.
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here. Under state law, New York foster parents did, in fact, have a
right to a pre-removal hearing in most cases where the foster child
had been in their care for an extended period." The district court
had found the system deficient in a number of respects, but the
most prominent deficiency was the failure of New York law to mandate a hearing regardless of whether any party had requested one. 51
The lower court was unwilling to allow hearings only when requested
by the foster parents. "We decline to rest the rights of the foster
children upon the shoulders of foster parents who, however wellmeaning, have a personal involvement and perhaps a financial interest which may color their conduct."52 In dismissing this rationale,
the Supreme Court noted that the logic of the district court contradicted the very emotional values upon which any purported constitutional right would rest. The Court said the constitutional interest
was to promote the "emotional cohesion of the family".53
[T]he constitutional liberty, if any, sought to be protected by the
New York procedures is a right of family privacy or autonomy, and
the basis for recognition of any such interest in the foster family must
be that close emotional ties analogous to those between parent and
child are established when a child resides for a lengthy period with a
foster family. If this is so, necessarily we should expect that the foster
parents will seek to continue the relationship to preserve the stability
of the family; if they do not request a hearing, it is difficult to see
what right or interest of the foster child is protected by holding a
hearing to determine whether removal would unduly impair his emotional attachments to a foster parent who does not care enough about
the child to contest the removal. 4
Thus, while the constitutional right was a joint one, extending to
both the foster parents and children, 5 the very nature of the right
requires that it be exercised by the parent on behalf of the entire
family.
The question not effectively analyzed by either the district court
50. Id. at 832 n. 32, 849 n. 56, 853.
51. 418 F. Supp. at 284-85.

52. Id. at 285.
53. 431 U.S. at 850 n. 57.
54. Id. at 850 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 842 n. 45.
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or the Supreme Court was whether the foster child should also be
given the power to request a pre-removal hearing. Both courts assumed that the wishes of the child relative to any contemplated
change of placement should not be given any controlling legal effect.
Such a proposition was inherent in the district court's directive that
hearings be held in every instance where a foster child is to be
removed from an established foster family relationship. It did not
trust the child to oppose an inappropriate change to a new foster
family. In addition, the wishes of those children who either agree
with or do not oppose a planned change of placement would be
consistently ignored. The Supreme Court made an identical assumption but with different effect. Against the complaint that the
Court's disposition would not allow effective avenues for the expression of the child's wishes, the Court said that "nothing in the New
York City procedure prevents consultation of the child's wishes,
directly or through an adult intermediary. We assume, moreover,
that some such consultation would be among the first steps that a
rational factfinder, inquiring into the child's best interests, would
pursue.""6 This may be true in those instances where foster parents
have requested a hearing, but in the event of their inaction the
objecting child would be left with no avenue to express his desire to
oppose a change in placement. In analyzing the nature of the constitutional rights at stake, and in concluding that the foster family's
right to family integrity was effectively preserved by actions of the
foster parents alone, the Court seemed to assume that the only
alternatives available were the automatic hearings imposed by the
district court or its own alternative of hearings only on the request
of the foster parent. It failed to directly address the question of
whether the objecting child should be given greater authority on his
own.
This omission is logically inconsistent with a proper conception
of the children's rights in the generic sense discussed earlier." Although not clearly expressed, it is apparent that the Supreme Court,
like the district court, assumed that "the child is unable to request
a hearing on his own" by reason of immaturity. 8 While this ultimate
56. 431 U.S. at 850.
57. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
58. 431 U.S. at 850.
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conclusion may have been correct, the issue still deserved explicit
consideration and analysis. Less apparent, but perhaps more relevant here, is the impact which the child plaintiffs' standing may
have had on this omission. Given the number of parties in the case
that purported to speak for the affected foster children, it is quite
surprising that the wishes of the named plaintiffs are never presented in either opinion. Both the district court and the Supreme
Court detail the living arrangements of the foster children who were
named plaintiffs"9 but neither opinion sets forth expicitly either the
children's wishes in regard to their present foster placements or the
procedural protections necessary to prevent inappropriate changes
in placement."0 Almost all of the named plaintiffs were teenagers or
just a few years short of that age" so they certainly would have been
capable of formulating and expressing preferences on these issues.
But the children really never had a means to express their desires.
While the child plaintiffs were named parties and their legal interests were conclusively adjudicated, they were never represented by
a legal advocate who pressed their decisional rights. The courtappointed counsel was clearly functioning in the capacity of a traditional guardian ad litem, ignoring the wishes of the children in order
to present what she herself perceived to be the welfare of the children.62 The Supreme Court described her position as that of "an
independent advocate for the welfare of the children. 6 3 Her position
of opposing any additional hearing rights for foster parents or foster
children was premised on her own view that "the best interests of
the children would not be served by procedural protections beyond
those already provided by New York law."64 The children's attorney
thus advocated this allegedly "independent" position rather than
the wishes of her clients.
59. Id. at 818 n. 1; 418 F. Supp. at 279-80.

60. The familial situations of the child plaintiffs suggest that they would have wanted to
remain with their foster parents. All had remained in their foster homes for some time and
were likely to be quite attached to their foster parents. See J. GoLDSmIN, A. FREUD & A.
SoLrr, BEYOND Thm BEST INTsRSTs OF THE CHD (1973). In fact, the record in a related state
proceeding confirms that several of the children had strong desires to remain in their foster
homes. State ex rel. Wallace v. Shotan, 51 A.D.2d 252, 380 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1976).
61. 431 U.S. at 818 n. 1.

62. Id. at 839.
63. Id. at 841 n. 44 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 839.
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The anomaly of this role is that the case was already filled with
welfare officials who were certainly capable of determining and articulating the children's "welfare." Defendants in the case included
welfare officials from the state, two local and one private child welfare agency and all argued the same position as the children's appointed counsel.6" Given the fact that attorneys generally lack any
formal training in child welfare and have no familial commitment
to their child clients, it is hard to perceive what gain there was in
having an attorney in this corner. An attorney is usually the party
least capable of correctly determining the welfare of a child. The one
element the case lacked was someone to speak for the wishes of the
children alone.
To the extent that this role was filled in the case, it fell upon the
foster parents and their attorney. Both the district court and the
Supreme Court allowed the foster parents standing to argue the
legal claims raised on behalf of the children.66 Both the district
court's holding based on the children's due process :rights and the
Supreme Court's generally sympathetic description of the plight67
and legal interests" of the New York foster child resulted from the
foster parents' arguments. It can also be inferred that the foster
parents were probably acting in accord with the named children's
wishes in attempting to keep them in their existent placements. All
of the children seemed content and emotionally established with
their foster parents, at least at the time of the district court proceedings, and would likely have wished to continue there. 9 But the
broader arguments of the foster parents on class relief also sought
to promote their own perceptions of the children's welfare rather
than their decisional rights. They sought the automatic hearing
requirement in order to remedy the glaring weaknesses and arbitrariness of the New York foster care system.70 As discussed earlier, this
remedy is designed to function without regard to the wishes of the
affected children and assumes their incapability to act to protect
their own interest. The foster parents sought to replace the existing
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 819 n. 2.
Id. at 841-42 n. 44, 842 n. 45.
Id. at 833-38.
Id. at 842-47.
See supra note 58.
See 431 U.S. at 838-39; 418 F. Supp. at 279.
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procedural system which functioned without children exercising
decisional power with a different system which also failed to give
children decisional rights.
The irony of the case is that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
rejecting a greater role for children in the New York hearing system
is belied in the very case before it. In refusing to extend to the foster
child the right to request a hearing before a change in placement,
the Court said that consultation with the foster child as to his wishes
"would be among the first steps that a rational factfinder, inquiring
into the child's best interests, would pursue." ' 71 It is not explained,
however, how the very case before the court was adjudicated without any such consultation.

The Supreme Court's recent companion decisions in Parham v.
J.L.72 and Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania v. Institu-

tionalized Juveniles73 reflect a similar confusion in analysis which
assumes that the transfer of greater power to the child necessarily
requires greater authority in state officials. These decisions were
rendered, however, without the added complexities of the standing
issues present in OFFER. Both cases dealt with the issue of what
due process procedures were required when parental and state custodians seek the admission of their children to state hospitals for the
mentally ill or mentally retarded. Parham dealt with a Georgia
statute, common to many states, which allowed the parent or guardian to admit a child "voluntarily" based on the parent's consent
alone, without regard to the child's wishes and without any preadmission or later judicial hearing.74 Institutionalized Juveniles
dealt with a similar system of substituted parental consent but
which also provided for a post-commitment judicial hearing in certain circumstances where either requested or initiated by the child. 5
In both cases the Supreme Court reversed lower court judgments
finding the state procedures unconstitutional and granting some71.
72.
73.
74.

431 U.S. at 852.
99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
GA. CODE §§ 88-503.1, 88-503.2 (1979).

75. 99 S.Ct. at 2524-25.
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what differing injunctive relief to the states' institutionalized children."
The Supreme Court's principal analysis of the constitutional issues was set forth in Parham,in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger.
The Court accepted the proposition that admission to a state hospital, although usually at the initiative of the private parent, constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.77 The Court
also agreed, although not uncritically, that the restraints on freedom and "social ostracism" caused by an admission to a mental
hospital mean that "a child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest" protected by the due process clause. 8 The existent Georgia procedure, however, was found sufficient in providing
all process which was due. Looking to a record which 'was barren "of
even a single instance of bad faith by any parent," the Court said
"that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if
not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of abuse or
neglect, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act
in the best interests of their child should apply."79 The Court did
believe that "the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to
have a child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently
great that some kind of inquiry should be made by a 'neutral factfinder' to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied."80 Further, the child had to be given an appearance before this "factfinder." 1 "Of course, the review must also
include an interview with the child." ' The Court found that the
traditional, medical decision-making process, already in use, met
these requirements.
It is not necessary that the deciding physician conduct a formal or
quasi-formal hearing. A state is free to require such a hearing, but due
76. J. L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub nom.,
Parham v. J. R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public
Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa.), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2505.
80. Id. at 2506.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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process is not violated by use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques. .. What is best for a child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each
case. We do no more than emphasize that the decision should represent an independent judgment of what the child requires and that all
sources of information that are traditionally relied on by physicians
and behavioral specialists should be consulted."
Although there is little depth of analysis, the opinion correctly
identifies the interests underlying the deference given parental desires: the usual immaturity of children and the parental responsibility fostered by the emotional bonds in the parent-child relationship.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, .and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of affec84
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
The substantial error in analysis is. the Court's assumption that the
only alternative to parental deference is additional governmental
oversight. Completely ignored, as in OFFER, is the alternative of
giving greater decisional authority to the affected children themselves. Chief Justice Burger posits greater governmental intervention in family life as the only means sought by the child plaintiffs
to deal with those parents who "may at time be acting against the

interests of the child."
The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect
their children is repugnant to the American tradition.
.. .Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a
child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the
power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or
officer of the state. . . Most children, even in adolescence, simply
are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
83. Id. at 2507.
84. Id. at 2504.
85. Id. (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated,
431 U.S. 119 (1977)).
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including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and
must make those judgments. . . .Neither state officials nor federal
courts are equipped to review such parental decisions. 6
For the Court to reject the alternative of giving children themselves greater control over the decision of whether to be admitted
to a state mental hospital would not have been surprising or even
unwise as a matter of constitutional policy. As will be discussed
below, 7 Chief Justice Burger is substantially correct in relying on
the family to be responsive to the child's needs and wishes. But to
fail to even mention or discuss the possibility in a case purporting
to decide the rights of children is an omission of major significance.
Part of the explanation for this lies in the general perspective of the
Court's analysis. The Court assumes uncritically that the overall
goal to be sought in defining a constitutionally acceptable admission system is to provide procedures which will best insure that the
child placed in a hospital "needs institutional care." 8 The phrases
"child's need" and the child's "best interests" are used throughout
the opinion.89 This perspective would never be applied in a case
dealing with the liberty interesti of adults. The adult is not subject
to mental commitment whenever he is in "need" of it. Rather, the
adult, even if mentally deficient in some respect, is usually given
the decisional authority to choose whether to enter a mental hospital on his own.8 Only if his condition reaches the level of dangerousness to himself or others can the state, or any other third party,
intervene and involuntarily secure hospitalization.' This is true
even in the great bulk of such situations, like that in Parham,where
the request for involuntary hospitalization comes from a close family member.
This anomoly grows even more curious when one considers the
dissenting and lower court opinions, none of which exgued for giving
a substantial measure of decisional power to the chi]d. Justice Bren86. Id. at 2504-05 (emphasis in original).
87. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
88. 99 S.Ct. at 2504.
89. See, e.g., 99 S.Ct. at 2502-11.
90. See generally Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190
(1974).
91. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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nan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, filed a dissenting
opinion in both Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles.9 2 In both
it is readily apparent that Justice Brennan shares Chief Justice
Burger's assumption that the protection of the children's rights requires that the government intervene on behalf of the child. In
Parham, Justice Brennan says his guiding proposition is that
"parental rights are limited by the legitimate rights and interests
of their children." 9 3 He argues that it is unrealistic "to assume
blindly that parents act in their children's best interests when making commitment decisions and when waiving their children's due
process rights."94 He agrees with the Chief Justice that a preadmission judicial-type hearing might unnecessarily intrude upon family
autonomy and functioning but says that requiring a post-admission
hearing "is unlikely to deter parents from seeking medical attention
for their children and . . . is unlikely to so traumatize parent and
child as to make the child's eventual return to the family impracticable." 5 Accordingly, he would require "the right to at least one postadmission hearing."9 Much of his dissent is a point-by-point rebuttal and he does not directly spell out the circumstances under which
the post-admission hearing would be required and, more importantly, the decisional role to be given to children. In concluding,
however, Justice Brennan makes the point strongly that he does not
expect the children to play a key role in the process. Rather, the
weight of this obligation would fall to a largely undefined
"champion."
Children incarcerated in public mental institutions ... are entitled
to some champion who can speak on their behalf and who stands
ready to oppose a wrongful commitment. Georgia should not be permitted to deny that opportunity and that champion simply because
the children's parents or guardians wish them to be confined without
a hearing ....
And fairness demands that children abandoned by
their supposed protectors to the rigors of institutional confinement be
given the help of some separate voice."
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

99 S. Ct. at 2515-22, 2528-29 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2518.
Id. at 2519.
Id. at 2521.
Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2522.
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The provision of such a "champion", presumably'the child's attorney, does not explicitly call for greater governmental power, but it
is implicit that this role would have to be funded, if not administered, by the state. Similarly, it is not explicit but still implied that
Justice Brennan wishes this individual to oppose "wrongful" commitments in the sense of those which are contrary to the child's
"best interests" rather than those which are unwished.
These implicit conclusions are somewhat more directly set forth
by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Institutionalized Juveniles.18
The Pennsylvania procedures at issue allow certain children admitted on the consent of their parents to request a post-admission,
judicial hearing. Mentally retarded children over 13 years of age and
all children labelled mentally ill must be notified of their right to a
hearing and given the telephone number of an attorney within
twenty-four hours of their admission. Justice Brennan finds these
procedures inadequate to meet his post-commitment hearing requirement because "the burden of contacting counsel and the burden of initiating proceedings is placed upon the child." 9 Children
would not be capable of acting on their own to assert their rights.
Many of the institutionalized children are unable to read, write, comprehend the formal explanation of their rights or use the telephone.
Few, as a consequence, will be able to take the initiative necessary
for them to secure the advice and assistance of a trained representative . . . Pennsylvania must assign each institutionalized child a
representative obliged to initiate contact with the child and ensure
that the child's constitutional rights are fully protected. Otherwise it
is inevitable that the children's due process rights will be lost through
inadvertence, inaction, or incapacity.10
What Justice Brennan is really setting forth is the argument that
children, or at least institutionalized children, are not capable of
properly exercising decisional power over the course of their lives.
He is, then, arguing against an extension of children's rights in the
generic sense discussed earlier. He, like Chief Justice Burger, looks
to a third party to protect the child. His only difference is that his
98. 99 S. Ct. 2528-29 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
99. Id. at 2529.
100. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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"champion" would operate within the legal model rather than the
Chief Justice's reliance upon a combination of traditional medical
techniques and a general deference to parental choice.
Justice Brennan's dissent in InstitutionalizedJuveniles concludes
with a citation to the lower court opinions' 1° and much of his analysis is given more explicit treatment there. The district court found
that "due process rights are violated in the absence of an automatic
post-commitment hearing, to be scheduled within a reasonable
time, and the presence of counsel to speak solely for the child's
interests.' ' 0 2 The Court said it would allow the child to waive the
right to a hearing and related procedural rights but not the right to
notice and counsel.' 3 But the required "unbiased tribunal" would
be allowed to accept the waiver only "upon approval by the child's
counsel and upon a finding that the child understands his rights and
is competent to waive them."'0 4 In other words, a hearing would
have to be held to determine whether the child would be allowed to
waive his right to a hearing. Every child, even those agreeing with
their admission, would then be required to appear in court and
participate in some form of hearing. Thus, the hearings are not only
automatic but required, in some form, in all cases, regardless of the
child's wishes.
That the child's desires are not controlling is given greater emphasis in the district court's discussion of the role and nature of the
"advocate" to be appointed for each child. This individual should
advance the child's "best interests," not his wishes.
It may not always be necessary to appoint a lawyer so long as a
substitute procedure adequately protects the child's interest. For example, it may be sufficient to appoint a guardian, trained in the
mental health field, who would advocate the child's interests or alternatively, have the power to retain a lawyer to do so. The important
101. Id.
102. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 459 F. Supp. at 46 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 44 n. 48 citing Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053-54 n. 26 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
104. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. at 1053-54 n. 26.
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point is that the child must have a capable advocate who has the sole
responsibility of advancing the child's best interests.0 5
Given the authority of the advocate to decide independently where
the child's best interests lie, this individual is given powers not
unlike that of the parent under the challenged statute. Similar
thinking appears in the lower court decision in Parham.16
The Parham and InstitutionalizedJuveniles cases were thus decided without any judicial discussion at any stage of the proceedings
seriously considering a clear expansion of children's rights in the
true, decisional sense. This gross omission must, at least partly, be
explained by the positions advocated on behalf of the child plaintiffs
by their attorneys. Courts, after all, grant only that relief requested
in the litigation and the Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles
district courts granted judgment for the child plaintiffs. While there
is no clear answer in the reported opinions, it must be presumed
that the relief contained in these judgments was that requested by
the children's lawyers. Since that relief fails to advance the decisional power of their clients, it follows that the attorneys acted in a
role of "champion" designed to further their own perception of the
children's best interests rather than expand the true rights of the
children. And given the fact that these cases proceeded without the
confusion over questions of legal standing present in OFFER, this
result cannot be blamed upon a lack of clear responsibility on the
part of counsel to represent their child clients.
IV.
In the recent abortion cases, the Supreme Court has more directly
confronted the role of the child's decisional power in another area
105. 459 F. Supp. at 44 n. 47.
106. The district court in Parham did not set forth its remedy in any great detail, leaving
such to be devised in the first instance by state authorities. 412 F. Supp. at 139-40. The court
did, however, order that all children already held in hospitals under the parental consent
statute be recommitted under existent juvenile court procedures or released. Id. at 140. The
operative statute under the state juvenile code allows a child to be committed only upon
"evidence" and a required "study and report" proving that the child requires hospitalization.
GA. CODE, § 24A-2601 (1976). Thus, the district court's order, like that in Institutionalized
Juveniles, seems to require an automatic hearing without regard to whether the child wishes
this to occur.
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of medical treatment. In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth'7 and separate 1976 and 1979 decisions in Bellotti v.
Baird,'08 the Court was presented with challenges to state laws restricting minors' access to abortion procedures. Traditionally, minors' abortions, to the extent legal, were treated as any other medical procedure for the purpose of consent. ' In most situations, the
parent had authority to give consent to treatment on behalf of the
child. ' Logically, this was largely the same situation as in Parham
and InstitutionalizedJuveniles; children challenged the law's deference to parental authority.
The abortion cases present results inconsistent with 1979's mental
commitment cases. Danforth dealt with Missouri statutes which
regulated abortions in a number of respects and the Court's decision
with respect to the parental consent requirement formed only a
relatively short portion of an otherwise lengthy opinion."' The statute at issue with respect to minors "impose[d] a blanket provision
. . .requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as
a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12
weeks of her pregnancy. 111 2 The state defendants argued that this

provision properly reflected the state's general deference to
"[p]arental discretion" and "the State's duty to protect the welfare of minors.

113

Given the constitutional weight generally attached to these interests, the Court's disposition is notable principally in its brevity,
rejecting the state's interests in a single paragraph. The Court said
that the challenged parental veto would not advance family functioning.
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with
absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the physician
and his minor patient, to terminate the patients' pregnancy will serve
to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power
107. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
108. 428 U.S. 132 (1976); 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
109. Cf. Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).

110. Id.
111. 428 U.S. at 72-75.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. at 73.
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will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.
Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of
the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.",'
The inconsistency comes in the fact that a parent's decision to
involuntarily admit a child to a state mental hospital has "fractured
the family structure" in a dramatically more substantial fashion.
Justice Brennan cogently made this argument in Parham.
[A]s in Danforth, the parent-child dispute at issue here cannot be
characterized as involving only a routine child-rearing decision made
within the context of an ongoing family relationship. Indeed,
Danforth involved only a potential dispute between parent and child,
whereas here a break in family autonomy has actually resulted in the
parents' decision to surrender custody of their child to a state mental
institution. In my view, a child who has been ousted from his family
has even greater need for an independent advocate."'
Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's response in Parhamwould seem to
fit as well in Danforth.He argues simply that children are immature
and the exercise of parental authority often requires that the child's
wishes be ignored:
Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or
because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to
make that decision from the parents. . . . The fact that a child may
balk at hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the parents' authority to
decide what is best for the child."'
He distinguishes the contrary result in Danforth solely on the basis
of the parent there having "an absolute parental veto over the
child's ability to obtain an abortion.' 1 7 "Parents in Georgia in no
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 75.
99 S. Ct. at 2519 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
99 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
Id.
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sense have an absolute right to commit their children to state mental hospitals; the statute requires the superintendent of each regional hospital to exercise independent judgment as to the child's
18
need for confinement."'
This distinction is more artificial than real and certainly cannot
serve to explain adequately the contrary results in Parham and
Danforth. A better, but still incomplete explanation was offered in
the 1979 decision in Bellotti v. Baird,"' delivered two weeks after
Parham.The case dealt with a Massachusetts statute which generally required minors seeking abortions to obtain the consent of their
parents, but which also allowed them to bypass their parents in
certain circumstances and secure judicial approval for the abortion. 110 The case was first presented to the Supreme Court in 1976
and the Court, in a decision decided with Danforth, directed that
the district court abstain until a decision could be reached in the
state courts on the circumstances under which a minor could avoid
a parental veto by resort to judicial approval. The Court believed
that the challenged statute might be interpreted in such a fashion
modify the federal constitutional
as "would avoid or substantially
12
challenge to the statute.
Following further proceedings in the state courts and the federal
district court, the case returned to the Supreme Court for decision
in the 1979 term. As interpreted by the state court, the challenged
statute permitted a court to authorize an abortion contrary to parental wishes only if the judge finds that the abortion is consistent
with the child's best interests and only if the parents are given
notice of the judicial proceedings.22 The Supreme Court found this
system to interfere unconstitutionally with the minor's abortion
rights but failed to provide any opinion supported by a majority of
the Court. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, delivered a plurality opinion.2' Justice
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Cum. Supp; 1978).
428 U.S. at 148.
99 S. Ct. at 3049.
Id. at 3035.
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Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, filed
24
a separate concurring opinion.'

Justice Powell's plurality opinion states that "if the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent
to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained."1 2 This
alternative procedure must allow the child to seek the non-parental
authorization in anonymity and without notice to parents. 1 6 Further, the judge or administrative officer designated for this purpose
must authorize the abortion if the child demonstrates either that
she is sufficiently mature to make her own abortion decision or even
if she is immature, that "the desired abortion would be in her best
interests."' 27 Justice Stevens' concurring opinion states that the
statute was improper simply because it allowed the state, through
either parents or a state court judge, to retain a veto over the mature
minor's abortion decision. In his view, the statute retained "an absolute third-party veto" and Danforth was controlling. 128 He found
it unnecessary to consider the other aspects of the statute or the
"hypothetical questions Mr. Justice Powell has elected to address."'"
Justice Powell was not opposed by Justice Stevens, however, in
articulating what he describes as the "unique" character of the
constitutional right at stake, which he says formed the basis for the
Danforth decision.' 0 Justice Powell reasons that the "severe detriment" resulting from the birth of an unwanted child presents unu3
sually burdensome consequences for the unmarried minor.1 ' Most

importantly, the decision to abort, and thereby to avoid these
"grave and indelible" consequences, cannot be postponed until the
child reaches majority.
124. Id. at 3053 (Stevens, J. concurring). Justice White filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Id. at 3055.
125. 99 S. Ct. at 3048 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 3048-49.
127. Id. at 3048.
128. Id. at 3053 (Stevens, J. concurring).
129. Id. at 3055 n. 4.
130. 99 S. Ct. at 3048.
131. Id.
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The pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing a
minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to marry. A minor
not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply
to postpone her decision. . . . A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively
expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.
IT]he abortion decision is one that simply cannot be postponed, or
it will be made by default with far-reaching consequences. 3 '
This rationale does, in part, distinguish the abortion decision
from that dealing with mental commitment.ln3 But it does not satisfactorily explain the degree of deference given the child's right to
choose an abortion when compared to the complete absence of explicit consideration of greater decisional power for the child in
Parham. Perhaps part of the explanation may be that the affected
children in the abortion cases have had their decisional rights fully
articulated without compromise. The irony is that this has occurred
in cases where children have had little or no actual role.
The first and principle case establishing minors' right to abortion,
Danforth,was litigated without any child plaintiffs. The case's only
plaintiffs were two physicians who performed abortions and
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri. 34 The Court allowed the.
physicians standing to argue the rights of their patients seeking
abortions, including juveniles. 35 The case dealt not only with the
abortion rights of minors. Rather, the case dealt broadly with a
Missouri statute passed in 1974 in response to a court decision finding its previous statutes unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade 38 and
Doe v. Bolton.'3 The new law regulated abortions in a broad fashion, imposing a number of generally restrictive procedural and substantive requirements. 38 The plaintiffs filed their suit only three
132. Id. at 3047-48.
133. It should be noted, however, that this explanation was never presented in Danforth.
Only three years later in Bellotti H was this more satisfactory rationale articulated.
134. 428 U.S. at 56-57.
135. Id. at 62.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
137. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
138. 428 U.S. at 58-59.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:661

days after the new law became effective. 3 ' The case presented an
obvious contest between pro- and anti-abortion forces. The plaintiffs' principal role lay thus not in expanding the rights of minors
generally but in expanding the availability of abortions. It does not
require great insight to perceive that juveniles might be deterred
from seeking and obtaining abortions if their parents retain substantial power over the abortion decision, as provided in the Missouri law. The plaintiffs thus were forced to vigorously challenge the
parents' authority, and strongly advocate the decisional rights of
children, in order to reap the greater goal of expanded availability
of abortions.
The Bellotti cases present a similar picture. While the case did
have a child plaintiff and the state law at issue was limited in
application to juveniles, 40 similar forces were involved The original
action was filed only a few days before a new Massachusetts statute
restricting minors' abortion rights took effect.14 Aside from an anonymous girl who desired an abortion without parental involvement,
the original plaintiffs included an abortion clinic, its director, and
a physician who regularly performed abortions.4 2 Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts and another family planning clinic were later
allowed to intervene.' The case was certified as a class action and
both the physician and institutional parties played a significant role
in advocating the interests of the juvenile class members. 4 4 The case

thus presented another confrontation between forces on either side
of the abortion question, with advocacy of greater decisional power
for children in the abortion area as the abortion advocates' means
of securing their ultimate goal. Despite the somewhat colored motives of the adult plaintiffs in Danforth and Bellotti, they must have
vigorously presented the rights of the child patients, else the Supreme Court would not have acted as it did.
Another possible reason distinguishing the result in the abortion
area may have been the Court's perception of the wishes of the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 56.
99 S. Ct. at 3039-40.
Id. at 3039.
Id.
Id. at 3040.
Id.
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affected children. The question of abortion affects only older children who the Court would undoubtedly consider more capable of
decision-making generally. Moreover, it would be expected that significant numbers of pregnant girls would independently want to
secure an abortion without having to go through their parents. In
5 But the
fact, the district court in Bellotti made just these findings. 11
fact that the evidence necessary for the court to so find was presented again hinged on the willingness and ability of the children's
advocate to fully present the case for their decisional rights.
V.
In these three areas, foster care, mental commitments, and abortions, the Supreme Court has announced largely inconsistent and
contradictory decisions. The OFFER and Parham decisions gave
little, if any consideration to the child's right to choose. OFFER
relied on the foster parents to assert the child's interest in avoiding
a wrongful change in foster care placement. Parham similarly relied
on the natural parent as the principal agent to insure that the child
is not erroneously placed in a mental hospital. Danforth and
Bellotti, however, announced completely different results, relying
upon children's decisional choices and largely rejecting parental
authority. The cases held that "mature" minors can obtain abortions based upon their wishes alone without any parental involvement whatsoever.
A possible, although largely speculative explanation for this inconsistency in the Supreme Court's treatment of children's asserted
rights to choose may have been the varying roles played by the
children's attorneys and other lawyers speaking on their behalf. As
any trial attorney knows, judicial decision-making hardly happens
in a vacuum and a complex of actions by a party's counsel can
influence a case's eventual result. More fundamentally, courts generally grant only those things which a party asks for and the court
looks to the lawyer to articulate the relief sought by his client.
Perhaps the Supreme Court has been providing no more to children
than what their attorneys have asked for.
145. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (D. Mass. 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F.
Supp. 997, 1001-02 (D. Mass. 1978).
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The district court in OFFER had required a hearing in every
instance when a child was to be moved from his established foster
home, even when not requested by the foster parent or the child.
While the district court in Parham did not fully detail the procedures it thought necessary, its companion in Institutionalized
Juveniles was not so restrained. Similar to OFFER, the district
court there ordered that a hearing be held automatically in every
instance where a child is placed in a mental institution, whether
requested or not. Thus, in both instances neither the lower courts
granting relief to the child plaintiffs nor the Supreme Court decisions reversing these judgments in fact relied on the child's right to
choose.
Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn is that the children's attorneys and those asserting their rights in the foster care and mental
commitment cases never really sought an increase in decisional
power for children. While using the mantel of children's rights, they
may have been seeking to secure for their clients a "welfare" which
they, the adult advocates, thought helpful or necessary. While the
Court reached a contrary result in Danforthand Bellotti, these decisions can be similarly viewed since the granting of decisional power
to the pregnant minor may have been a goal secondary to the adult's
desire to secure wider provision of abortions.
All three sets of decisions may be explained by the child advocates' own view of the worth of the substantive benefit or service at
issue. In OFFER, and in the Parhamand InstitutionalizedJuveniles
cases, the foster care and public mental hospital systems were portrayed as quite bleak. Justice Brennan in OFFER devoted an entire
section to the child advocates' indictment of the New York foster
care system.' 46 Similarly, the district courts in Parham and
InstitutionalizedJuveniles detailed the plaintiffs' evidence that the
Georgia and Pennsylvania state mental hospitals provided scant
treatment for child inmates and served largely as custodial warehouses.1 47 On the contrary, in Danforth and Bellotti, abortion was
presented as a valid and sometimes necessary alternative for minors
to avoid the consequences of improvident sexual acts.
146. 431 U.S. at 833-38.
147. 412 F. Supp. at 119-28; 402 F. Supp. at 1043-45; 459 F. Supp. at: 36-40.
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Thus, in all three sets of cases, children's rights may have been
the mere vehicle for adult "child savers" to criticize or promote
substantive systems serving youth. Robert Burt has convincingly
argued that much of the Supreme Court's decisional law dealing
with children reflects the claims of adults rather than the affected
children.' 4s "The battle between state and parent in these cases
seems remarkably like typical divorce custody disputes, in which
neither adult seems incontentably correct, and each seems locked
in a power struggle with the other, using the child as weapon and
trophy while ignoring his needs."'49
The obvious danger is that the courts' attention is mistakenly
diverted from the actual legal issue decided. In Institutionalized
Juveniles, for example, Chief Justice Burger referred to the district
court's remedy as an "overdose" of due process. 10 To the extent that
this observation was accurate, such was the result of the failure of
the children's attorneys to rely upon the decisional rights of their
clients in their requested relief. If the purported right asserted is the
child's right to liberty, it is contradictory to suggest relief where
children must have a hearing prior to a hospital admission whether
they want one or not. By denying the capability of their clients to
exercise the choice of whether to consent or object to their admission, the children's lawyers substantially undermined their own arguments that juveniles require the same due process model as is
used for adults. Had they instead sought a less cumbersome remedy
giving children expanded decisional authority, like that for adults,
it is possible that the decision might have been different. 5 '
148. Burt, Developing ConstitutionalRights Of, In, and For Children,39 LAw & CoNTro.
PnoB. 118 (1976).
149. Id. at 121-22.
150. 99 S. Ct. 2526 n. 7 (quoting the district court's dissenting opinion, 459 F. Supp. at
53).
151. The position of the plaintiff's attorneys may have also particularly prejudiced the
legal position of foster children. The court allowed their state custodians the same authority
to commit given natural parents. 99 S. Ct. at 2512. Given the frequent arbitrariness existent
within the foster care system, OFFER, 431 U.S. 833-38, and the lack of emotional bonds
between the foster child and his state custodian, see discussion infraat notes 45-47, this result
is particularly disturbing. The Court substantially based its holding on the fact that "neither
the District Court nor the appellees has suggested that wards of the State should receive any
constitutional treatment different from children with natural parents." 99 S. Ct. at 2512.
(emphasis added). The Court also cited the plaintiffs' failure to prove that state foster care
custodians acted or would act arbitrarily in admitting children to mental hospitals. Id.
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The question also arises as to what the children's attorneys would
have won for their clients in OFFERand Parhamhad they prevailed
in the Supreme Court. The automatic hearing remedy sought in
both cases would have simply replaced the child's dependency upon
natural parents in Parham and foster parents in OFFER with a new
judicial model administered by the state. The decisional power
would simply have been substantially transferred from a parent
figure to a state official. The child would have remained largely
powerless.
Moreover, there is substantial reason to believe that the parent
figure would be more responsive to the wishes of the child and that
the imposition of the automatic judicial model would result in an
actual decrease of power for the child. The parent or established
foster parent normally has a substantial emotional bond with the
child.1 2 There is psychological evidence that the parent-child bond
requires that the parent normally be responsive to the child's needs,
but one does not need psychological expertise to understand the
child's ability to successfully influence parental decision-making.
For example, even a newborn baby can voice his desires by crying
and see that the parent gratifies his wishes to be fed, held and
changed. Children, of course, often fail to get their parents to conform to their wishes but the parent-child bond at least gives them
a substantial avenue of influence. The daily contact and emotional
intimacy of family life gives the child a great deal of power, most of
which would be lost in a routinized judicial model.
There is also no reason to expect the state-run judicial model to
function any more appropriately than the state-run foster care and
mental-health systems they were expected to scrutinize. The juvenile court, after all, was supposed to play the very same advocate's
role but it certainly has never lived up to this expectation.'5 A civil
servant wearing the hat of an administrative or judicial hearing
officer is subject to the same bureaucratic distance and unresponsiveness as his first cousins, the social worker and state psychiatrist."'
There is simply no reason to expect that Justice Brennan's wished152. J.

GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD AND A SoLNrr, supra note 60.
153. Id.
154. A. PLATr, supra note 17.
155. See Parham, 99 S. Ct. 2508.
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for "champion" will be anything other than a rehash of the present
cast of government officials.
If we wish to promote children's rights, we should make sure that
children gain greater, not less, power over their lives. If we wish
instead to give them a "champion," let us look to the only individual with the emotional bond and commitment necessary for this
arduous task, the parent.

